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Abstract: The purpose of this article is to benefit those among the
readership currently engaged in designing the strategies and tactics
of the struggle against the Islamic State (IS) group, a movement
led by Abu Bakr al Baghdadi that has become the scourge of Iraq
and Syria.

I

n the rational pursuit of vital interests in any human undertaking,
the design of concrete actions to pursue them must subordinate to a
conceptual strategic design based on a well-researched theory of the
specific situation.1 Any such theory will be based on a combination of
hard data and educated guesses about what those data mean. The underlying research must encompass not only the historic sweep of similar
cases (history does not repeat, it educates), but it must also examine
the peculiarities and differences of the present situation compared to
any that came before. Finally, because of the differences between the
present case and those of the past, it must adapt, rather than adopt, past
practices. What results from such inquiry and contemplation is a rough
but useful strategic framework that can be adapted as learning occurs.
At the core of such a framework is a theory of the situation at the very
heart of the matter and a strategy for resolving it – a core strategy. Other
secondary aspects of the situation are accounted for separately in supporting strategies. Having an explicit consensus among allies on a core
strategy aligns costly allied operations. Such a core strategy should drive
the design of tactics and supporting strategies.2
My own enquiries along this line have led me to the following core
strategy for accomplishing the vital and very difficult tasks at the heart
of the IS crisis.

The Heart of the Matter

This situation is so complex that it is easy to lose focus. One must
find, isolate, and take aim at the heart of the matter. The aspect of the
situation making the present status quo intolerable enough to trigger a
new American (and allied) intervention is the rule of the Islamic State
militant group across great parts of Syria and Iraq, and the threat of this
7th century model of governance spreading if not checked at its origin.
(There are already indications of this possibility in North Africa and
elsewhere.) As such a regime swells in territory and membership, not

1      This is a revision of a paper I circulated among planners and interested parties in August 2014
entitled “On ‘Ridding the World’ of ‘The Islamic State.’”
2      To my way of thinking strategies are logical schemes for achieving broad conceptual ends
employing conceptual ways and means along several lines of effort. Tactics are the practical schemes
for achieving concrete ends employing concrete ways and means.
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only Middle Eastern populations will be at risk, but also those of secular
industrialized nations across the globe. In other words, the IS problem
is not a Syrian or Iraqi problem, it is an international problem. And it needs an
international perspective to resolve it.
Moreover, IS is, both structurally and in terms of its aims and
methods, significantly different than Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda does not need
to control territory to exist. It only needs to promote and work toward
a foreordained future caliphate. To be what it is, IS needs to control territory and to rule a population by strict Sharia law, on the 7th century
model prescribed by the Prophet Mohammed in Koranic scriptures. It
draws immigrants to that territory by offering a place for those who
wish to live under such rule, and a regime that rigorously enforces such
laws. IS also provides a cause that pursues concrete near-term objectives within the current generation rather than the more distant ones
Al Qaeda followers pursue across many generations. And that cause,
succinctly expressed, is to defend, sustain, and expand a place and a
regime that rules according to the prophet Mohammed’s 7th century
vision in every respect. Finally, because their ends are foreordained by
the Prophet, IS leaders and fighters are emboldened to take great risks.
This boldness, and the successes they have achieved, combines to attract
action oriented adherents from abroad.
The difficulty for the largely secular-minded international community is that IS does not advocate a “perversion” of Koranic scriptures.
It adheres to a strict interpretation of un-ambiguous prophetic passages
of the holy book. And, like other believers of the Muslim faith, its
members believe the Prophet Mohammed faithfully recorded the true
word of Allah. What religious splits exist between IS orthodoxy and
most other Sunni Muslim authorities (including Salafists of any stripe)
are over methods and timing - gentler methods of the struggle now and
a foreordained caliphate later. As a result, it will be difficult to drive a
wedge, solely on the grounds of religious principle, between the IS and
other Sunni Muslim believers, including moderate ones and many of
Assad’s other opponents in Syria.3 More effective wedge issues must be
developed and used.
Changing an intolerable status quo, such as this, into an acceptable
one is ambitious. Therefore the “acceptable aim” should be no more
difficult than it needs to be. But it needs to be more than vague rhetoric,
as is the general twin aims to “degrade, disrupt and defeat IS,” and
to “defend the allied homelands from IS inspired terrorist attacks.” A
useful core strategy needs to be more specific about ends, ways and
means. What this amounts to is a core strategy designed around three
major lines of effort clearly expressed in three short paragraphs of simple
declaratory sentences.
The first line of operation is to win the struggle over the legitimacy
to govern, make laws, and enforce them between IS and the alternative
indigenous regime that will follow. Legitimacy is granted from below not
imposed from above. Winning along this line of effort requires creating stable, functioning, and extremist resistant indigenous communities
3      I would like to acknowledge the comments of Dr. Alice Butler-Smith of the School of
Advanced Military Studies on the August 2014 draft. Also see Graeme Wood, “What ISIS Really
Wants,” The Atlantic (March 2015). Also see Audrey Kurth Cronin, “ISIS Is Not a Terrorist Group,”
Foreign Affairs 94, no. 2 (March/April 2015): 87-98.
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under a political regime they consider legitimate. An effective interim
replacement regime must be operational immediately in the aftermath of
town-by-town and village-by-village fighting. (How these communities
will fit into a stable Syria or Iraq, is a secondary concern at this point.)
At present, the core strategic end of US policy is to recover Iraqi towns
and villages to Iraqi sovereign control, and to support the more secular,
or less extreme, opposition to Assad’s regime in the Syrian civil war
toward both an overthrown of the Assad regime, and a defeat of the
Islamic state movement . The problem is these complex ends may make
impossible the less ambitious one of first creating stable, functioning, and
extremist resistant indigenous communities under a local political regime they consider
legitimate.
The second is to defend the occupied populations in Syria and Iraq from
the “armed propaganda” of the violent IS militants during the fighting for
each community and afterwards. A fearful and exposed population is
lost to whomever attempts to govern next. Winning along this line of
effort requires a very disciplined interim political and security regime to
provide immediate security. It must be capable immediately of discovering and arresting covert indigenous IS cells. And it must immediately
begin to recruit and train a competent and trustworthy indigenous selfdefense force.
The third is the offensive effort to defeat the militant group and its agencies town-by-town and village-by-village. Winning along this line of effort
would require a focused and discriminating force to do three things:
destroy the IS “terrorist army” and its weapons; prevent the escape of its
members to organize anew elsewhere; and retain the moral high ground
and legitimacy in the process.
The power of this trinity derives from synergy among the three
major lines of effort, but a weakness in one cannot be compensated by
the strength of another. The power to transform intentions into desired
outcomes along each of these lines of effort depends on finding and
applying an effective causal logic unique to this situation, which is the
subject of the following paragraphs.

Winning the Legitimacy to Govern

Winning the legitimacy to govern territory occupied by IS requires
separating IS from the support of the people in that territory and transferring their support to an alternative they can accept. IS relies on the
people for protection, intelligence, supplies, funds, and recruits. This
support is partly coerced through conquest by military power. It will be
difficult to have the people of the occupied region see IS and its fighters
as violent outlaws ruling illegally, as is the secular view, when what they
do can be justified by some using scripture. An additional difficulty is
their support is also derived from indigenous and immigrant believers
in the IS orthodoxy and cause.
There are some obvious mistakes to avoid. In Afghanistan and Iraq
we saw how quickly the relief of liberation from one oppressive regime
can turn into dissatisfaction with the regime of a foreign liberator.
Differences in nationality are not all that makes a foreigner. Iraqis and
Syrians of a different religion and ethnicity will be judged “foreign” in
the communities they liberate.
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IS derives moral authority when it is regarded the warriors of a legitimate Muslim Caliphate. This authority must be undermined as much as
possible by word and deed. The conduct of allied fighters is regulated by
international law, that of IS fighters is regulated by 7th century Koranic
scriptures. When IS fighters bear arms and use them, in secular eyes they
become common criminals, not “war criminals.” The legal secular logic
of modern states is this: when IS fighters are captured, they are arrested,
tried by legitimate authorities, and punished for their crimes according to the laws of the country where they committed them. Legitimate
international authorities, and the people who have been oppressed by IS,
must together judge the prisons and courts legitimate.
An effective interim replacement regime must be organized townby-town and village-by-village before the fighting begins. It must be
operational immediately in the aftermath. There is no such thing as
“ungoverned space” except when it is unpopulated. Some form of
governance takes shape organically, and violent groups like IS will
either impose their form of order, or influence the existing one to their
advantage. There is no useful objective standard for governance, only a
relative one. The governance of the replacement regime and its agencies
must be better in the eyes of the people than the alternative. People
will favor indigenous governors over foreign ones. This is why foreigners have such difficulty with winning the struggle for the legitimacy to
govern. To the extent IS is seen as foreign, and the replacement regime
as indigenous, the better the result.
If a force comprised of allied “foreigners” is necessary to remove
IS fighters from occupied communities and neighborhoods, the allied
fighting force must shortly move on to the next fight and an interim
indigenous political and security regime must take its place to organize,
resource, and develop a functioning community under an acceptable
and permanent indigenous governance. It would be unrealistic to expect
Sunni communities in, Anbar province, for instance, to accept as “indigenous” a Shia militia from anywhere else in Iraq. Likewise the successful
relief of Kobani in Syria can be credited as much, or more, to the ethnic
affinity of the Kurdish fighters on the ground to the citizens of the town
than to the increased allied air support these fighters received.
It will be necessary to place a layer of autonomy between these communities and centralized nationalistic governance. And when they are
incorporated into national political structures, they must have a voice in
the government.

Defending the Population from “Armed Propaganda”

The second struggle of this trinity—defending the population from
the “armed propaganda” of violent IS extremists—is crucial to being
able to govern legitimately.
And, liberated communities need immediate protection from staybehind IS elements and re-infiltration of IS fighters and agents. And
undisciplined occupying strangers of the allied side must not be allowed
to impose a tyranny of their own.
Violent movements like IS extort intelligence, recruits, support,
and compliance through fear, threat and cruelity example – for example
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the numerous public beheadings that have been reported under IS rule.
Without these enablers, violent movements wither.
Once security and governing elements of IS are driven out of the
communities they occupy, they will attempt to leave covert cells behind,
or re-infiltrate them later. The proverbial “three men and one knife” in
an otherwise unarmed community can control the people. The antidote
is around-the-clock security, which is costly in manpower and difficult
to emplace from the outside and is best done from inside out and bottom
up, with motivated and trusted self-defense forces. It must be the primary
task of the interim political and security regime to provide immediate
security to discover and arrest covert indigenous IS cells, and to recruit
and train a competent and trustworthy indigenous self-defense force.
It is possible to avoid the mistakes of the “Sunni Awakening” and
“Son’s of Iraq” model of several years ago and still take advantage of
old-fashioned social and political structures to build local security forces
without creating a “Sunni Army.” First, it is necessary to incorporate this
idea into the original strategy. I envision the local indigenous regimes
that finally replace IS in the occupied territories to emerge from the
bottom up, as communities are “liberated.” If so, then this local security
force is automatically subordinated to whatever indigenous governmental structures evolve from the bottom-up. Community by community
liberation plans not only address removing ISIS control but also plan
for an interim political regime and a disciplined interim security force
that rapidly is phased out as a permanent local force under local civilian
control replaces it.
Because this line of effort is also the most expensive in terms of
trained and armed manpower there is really no other alternative. Some
studies based on rare historical successes have judged the price to be no
less than 20 security personnel per 1,000 citizens.4 Whatever the specific
number, removing IS without immediately securing the aftermath is a
wasted effort because the “cancer” will return.

Fighting and Defeating IS

Keeping people safe and getting them on the side of peace under a
legitimate local government is not enough. The movement led by Abu
Bakr al Baghdadi will not be defeated if the IS “terrorist army” is not
confronted with a two armed approach capable of enforcing its destruction in place and preventing its escape to organize anew elsewhere. And
for the outcome to be victory, these operations must be focused and discriminating, so that the lives and property of the people IS has enslaved
and impoverished are preserved. Retaining the moral high ground and
legitimacy in the process is crucial to success.
Accomplishing these tasks will depend on getting to know the
enemy very well, having good intelligence at the beginning and building an ever greater capacity as operations progress, and being more
creative and strategically savvy than the enemy. It will depend on skilled
surgery to excise the militant group and its agents town-by-town and

4      James T. Quinlivan, “Force Requirements in Stability Operations,” Parameters 25, no. 4 (Winter
1995-96): 59-69. Also see Huba Wass de Czege, “On Policing The Frontiers of Freedom,” Army 56,
no. 7 (July 2006): 14-22.
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village-by-village. And destroying the IS “terrorist Army” in place, and
preventing the escape of its members.
Pursuing offensive war against any determined enemy ought to
proceed along two complementary lines. The first combines powerful
measures aimed at influencing the decisions of the enemy’s uppermost
leadership, and softening the will of followers and supporters. A second
combination of strong measures and maneuver makes the decisions of
IS leaders irrelevant by negating their power to resist conditions that we
might wish to impose on them regardless of how their will is affected.
The power in this approach is how these two “arms” combine, rather
than what they achieve separately.
The first arm operates on the ancient logic of offensive war — the
destructive military instrument, combined with all other means of
applying psychological pressure, operates on the state of mind of leaders,
followers, and supporters, causing them to give up fighting and accept
the will of their enemy. This logic applies mostly to winning battles and
firefights. It is a very insufficient logic for winning wars. In fact, it may
prolong warfare when the occupied populations are exposed to heavy
casualties in the process and the survivors become enraged and join the
defense of IS territories.5
When it is necessary to change an intolerable status quo, it is not sufficient to rely on military operations that merely generate losses among
enemy leaders and followers. IS will use brutal tactics and, like Hamas in
Gaza, will shield itself among innocent civilians. It will starve the population to remain well fed. IS will fight fanatically. It is actually necessary
to take away the IS leadership’s options other than capitulation, one by
one. This option-eliminating and constricting arm includes systematic
encirclement of separate communities to reduce them piecemeal, simultaneous attacks from multiple directions to divide IS fighting efforts,
closing borders to escaping or reinforcing IS fighters and leaders, relentless pursuit into sanctuaries to eliminate safe havens, and constricting,
and then stopping, all forms of organized motorized movement, and all
means of organizational support to include: taxation, extortion, conversion of local oil supplies into funds, the flow of arms and ammunition,
strategic and tactical information, food for its fighters, and, most of all,
the flow of immigrants and recruits.
These enforcement challenges can be overcome only when the other
two elements of the trinity— defending the population from armed propaganda and winning the population to the side of peace under better
governance—function well.

Conclusion

This core strategy may not be self-evident to all, but it can serve to
inspire better ones based on newer knowledge and better research. This
“trinitarian” core strategy is fruitful. I have raised matters important to
get “right enough” and important to achieve consensus with allies, the
sooner the better. It is less important how good the initial core strategy

5      Huba Wass de Czege, “Military Power, the Core Tasks of a Prudent Strategy, and the Army
We Need,” Strategic Studies Institute, August 6, 2014, http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/
index.cfm/articles/Military-Power-Core-Tasks-of-Prudent-Strategy/2014/08/06.
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is than to treat it as a work in progress, adapting as learning takes place.
Once adopted it is more important to engage all parties in trying to prove
it inadequate than to prove it correct. And, whatever emerges as a core
strategy, there will be great temptations to compromise its principles in
execution. For success, this very difficult undertaking will require allied
unity and disciplined execution. Otherwise, this intervention will not
achieve a worthy end. And, the fighting will continue until intervening
powers tire of it.

